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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OCEAN
FRANCIS T. CHRISTY, JR.*

Property rights in the world ocean are undergoing a major transition as the principle of the freedom of the seas comes under increasing pressure from economic and political forces. The freedom of the
seas means, in essence, that the ocean's resources are exploited under
the conditions of common property. This did not produce significantly detrimental consequences until after the Second World War,
when demand for ocean resources increased very rapidly. The economic waste resulting from the common property condition is now
very high. But there are, in many instances, considerable difficulties
and costs associated with the removal of the conditions of common
property, and it is not clear that the benefits are sufficient to cover
the costs. But whether or not removal of the common property
condition is economically justifiable, the political pressures for
acquiring exclusive rights can be considered inexorable. The problem
is one of accommodating these pressures while minimizing conflict
and economic waste.
INTRODUCTION
The subject of property rights in the oceans is both timely and
complex. It is timely because the resources of the oceans are in a
state of transition from the condition of no one's jurisdiction to that
of someone's jurisdiction. This process of transition is occurring both
because of the rapid growth of economic pressures on the seas' resources and because of the sudden interest in the seas' wealth expressed by a host of newly emerging nation-states. The subject of
ocean property rights is now being addressed by the third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the third session of which
was held in March and April of this year in Geneva.
The complexity of the subject is due not only to the unclear status
of jurisdiction but also to the wide variety of ocean resources and
uses that are now requiring the exercise of jurisdiction by some
agent, whether that agent be some group within a nation, the nation
itself, some group of nations, or the world community. For fisheries
*Resources for the Future, Inc.
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there are special complications deriving from the fugitive nature of
the resource and the fact that fish do not respect man's boundaries.
Because of these complexities it is impossible to deal in detail with
all of the many important problems associated with the acquisition
and exercise of property rights in the oceans.1 Instead, this paper
will briefly sketch the background and focus attention on a few of
the problems believed to be of greatest interest; that is, the problems
associated with the transaction costs of acquiring and enforcing satisfactory property rights.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS AND COMMON PROPERTY
As stated above, the resources of the ocean are going through a
fundamental transition, from being subject to no one's jurisdiction to
becoming subject to someone's jurisdiction. In the former situation,
property rights do not exist in any meaningful sense; in the latter
situation, satisfactory property rights may or may not exist, depending upon how the jurisdiction is exercised.
The absence of satisfactory property rights means that the resources are essentially treated as common property resources. Because of the importance of this term for a discussion of property
rights it seems useful to specify the significant characteristics of a
common property natural resource.
A. It is a natural resource whose flow of services has economic
value.
B. The flow of services is treated as indivisible.
C. The flow of services can be used by any individual economic
unit within a group of economic units.
D. There is no agent that controls access within the group of
economic units to the flow of services from the resource.
At the international level for those resources found beyond national jurisdiction common property resources include fisheries, the
minerals of the deep sea bed, the use of ocean space for maritime
commerce in areas of congestion (such as the English Channel), and
the assimilating capacities of the oceans for waste disposal. The
group of economic units is the nation-states of the world community. The condition of common property emerges from the principle
of the freedom of the seas which guarantees free and open access to
all nations.
At the national level treatment of a resource as common property
depends, in part, upon the choice of the government. Fisheries, for
1. For an excellent introduction to the literature on the law of the sea in general, see A.
Hollick, Marine Policy, Law and Economics (1970).
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example, are generally treated as common property in the United
States and western Europe, but are not common property in Japan,
the Soviet Union, and the Eastern Bloc countries, where access is
controlled. Other resources in the United States that are, or have
been, treated as common property include common oil pools, the
radio spectrum, air, bodies of water, recreational lands, and wildlife.
For some of these, the common property characteristic has been
removed by making the flow of services from the resource divisible
or by controlling access. It should be noted that in some cases the
control of access may be insufficient to prevent the wasteful consequences of exploiting a common property resource.
Distinctions should be made between the term "common property" and the terms "public property" and "the commons ""Common property" relates specifically to the conditions governing access
to the resource, not to the nature of the owners or of those who
exercise jurisdiction or control over the resource. Thus, public property is sometimes treated as common property and sometimes not.
Examples of the former treatment are the many outdoor recreation
areas that are publicly owned and freely accessible to all members of
the public. Examples of the latter are the National Forest grazing
lands and timber lands. These are also publicly owned, but the flow
of services is made divisible and access is restricted to individual
economic units by leases and other techniques.
With regard to the commons the condition of common property
was generally removed when the commons were used for pasture. H.
Scott Gordon, the first economist to analyze the common property
condition in fisheries, pointed out that the commons usually became
"stinted." 2
Perhaps the most interested similar case is the use of common
pasture in the medieval manorial economy. Where the ownership of
animals was private but the resource on which they fed was common
(and limited), it was necessary to regulate the use of common pasture in order to prevent each man from competing and conflicting

with his neighbors in an effort to utilize more of the pasture for his
own animals. Thus the manor developed its elaborate rules regulating

the use of common pasture or "stinting" the common: limitations
on the number of animals, hours of pasturing, etc., designed to

prevent the abuses of excessive individualistic competition. 3
2. The noun, stint, is defined as "the limited number of cattle, according to kind,
allotted to each definite portion into which pasture or common land is divided, or to each
person entitled to the right of common pasturage." The Oxford Universal Dictionary on
Historical Principals (3rd ed. rev. with addenda 1955).
3. Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J.
Pol. Econ. 135 (No. 2, 1954).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

The use of the commons for recreational purposes generally remains unstinted. Even though it may be limited to a group or community, access by members of the group is still free and open.
Even in primitive societies it is apparent that the common property condition did not persist when the resources became scarce.
"Speaking generally, we may say that stable primitive cultures appear
to have discovered the dangers of common-property tenure and to
have developed measures to protect their resources." 4
Distinctions might also be made between the term common property and the terms res nullius (things unowned) and res communes
(things owned in common). But as Professor Douglas Johnston has
said, "The academic dispute between res nullius and res communes is
now almost-but not quite-silenced. Through the centuries it has
continued to shed light on the legal mind, but failed to provide a
lasting basis for the settlement of fishery disputes... (The) question
whether the seas, or the high seas, are res nullius or res communes is
improper; both terms should be rejected, for they merely confuse a
question which is already complicated enough as it is." '
Generally, the condition of common property exists where the
costs (social, political, or economic) of acquiring and enforcing rights
of property are greater than the benefits that can be obtained. The
costs of acquiring and enforcing property rights may be high for a
wide variety of reasons, including the large spatial extent or the
fugitive nature of the resource, the desire to maintain freedom of
use, and objections by those who might be excluded. Benefits of
acquiring property rights may be low in situations where the flow of
services is abundant relative to the demand.
As long as the flow of services is so abundant that use by one
economic unit does not diminish the value of use by others, the
consequences of maintaining the common property condition are not
particularly damaging. But when use by one impinges on use by
others, inefficiencies will result. These inefficiencies may be in the
form of physical wastes such as depletion of a stock of fish or congestion of traffic in a narrow strait. Or they may be of an economic
character because of the attraction of redundant amounts of capital
and labor. Under common property conditions, no individual user
can afford to take future returns into account. He has no incentive to
restrain current use for the benefit of future returns because there is
4. Id. 134-35. See also B. Malinkowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society 17 (1959);
Davidson, Family Hunting Territories in Northwestern North America, Indian Notes and
Monographs 19-22 (No. 46, 1928).
5. D. Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries: A Framework for Policy-Oriented
Inquiries 303 (1965).
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no assurance that he will capture a satisfactory share of the returns.
Also, under common property conditions, capital and labor will inevitably flow in until total costs and revenues, rather than marginal
costs and revenues, are equal.
For ocean resources these consequences are most clearly demonstrated in the exploitation of fisheries and marine mammals. Numerous stocks throughout the world have been depleted-fished to the
point where the annual yield is less than the maximum that can be
sustained. In some cases conservation controls have been imposed
and have been relatively effective in restoring yields to their maximum. With only one or two exceptions, however, these controls
have not significantly changed the common property condition.
Indeed, many of these controls have exacerbated economic waste
rather than alleviated it, as illustrated in the following examples.
One form of conservation control is that of raising costs (or preventing declining costs) by imposing technological inefficiencies on
fishing effort. At the turn of the century, when steam power came
into general use for fishing vessels, Maryland prohibited dredging
oyster beds in the Chesapeake Bay by automotive power. While most
other states developed a system of private property rights for oyster
farming, Maryland persisted in treating the beds as common property. As a result, Maryland has the last remaining commercial sailing
fleet in the United States. While this archaic harvesting technique is
manifestly inefficient and Maryland's oyster catch is ten percent of
former yields (for a variety of reasons), it must be admitted that
society receives some value from the maintenance of the lovely skipjacks and bugeyes and the preservation of an independent and individualistic way of life.
A more direct conservation tool is that of limiting total catch.
Under this approach, a total quota is announced at the opening of
the season and, when the quota is reached, all fishing ceases until the
next season. This approach induces each fisherman to build more,
larger, and faster vessels in order to get as large a share for himself
before the total quota is reached and the season closes. Since all
fishermen operate under the same incentive, excessive units of capital
and labor are employed, and the season shortens.
In 1967 a total quota was imposed on the catch of yellowfin tuna
in the regulatory area of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. Up until 1967 the total size of the tuna fleets of all countries in
the area was fairly steady at about 45,000 tons of capacity. By 1973
capacity had increased about three-fold, to 133,000 tons.6 The size
6. S. Saila and V. Norton, Tuna: Status, Trend, and Alternative Management Arrangements 40 (1974).
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of the total quota was also increased, but by less than 100 percent,
with the result that the season dropped from its usual nine or ten
months to about three months. In addition to the inefficiencies
manifested by the redundant units of effort, this system has had
global ramifications. At the close of the yellowfin season in the
eastern Pacific the vessels move to the Atlantic, where they have
placed further pressures on tuna stocks that are already at, or
beyond, the point of maximum sustainable yield. It might be noted
that in the three major oceans-Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian-skipjack is the only major species of tuna that has opportunities for
further increases in yield.
These kinds of controls exacerbate the economic waste that is
already present as a result of the common property condition. Virtually all economic studies of fully utilized fisheries have demonstrated that there are redundant amounts of capital and labor and
that the costs associated with these can be considerable. For example, it was estimated in the mid-60's that the same amount of
salmon (and same gross revenues) could be taken with $50 million
less capital and labor than was annually employed at that time.7
With a three-fold increase in price and a decline in catch since then,
the current amount of redundant capital and labor is likely to be
considerably larger.
British Columbia, Alaska, and Washington have all adopted controls over access to salmon fisheries. Only the British Columbia
scheme has been in effect long enough to produce results. In 1968
the number of vessels that could be licensed to fish for salmon was
limited. The scheme has been so effective that the value of a license
has reached levels of $5,000 to $6,000 per ton of vessel. Thus a
new entrant with a 25 ton vessel must buy out previous owners at a
cost of $125,000 simply for the privilege of fishing.
With a few exceptions, the license limitation systems in Alaska and
Washington are the only ones in effect for marine fisheries in the
U.S. While economic waste in other U.S. fisheries is not likely to be
as large as that for salmon, it is still pervasive.' There are no esti7. J. Crutchfield and G. Pontecorvo, The Pacific Salmon Fisheries: A Study of Irrational

Conservation 174 (1969).
8. See Crutchfield and Zellner, Economic Aspects of the Pacific Halibut Fishery, 1
Fishery Industrial Research (No. 1, 1963); E. Lynch, R. Doherty, & G. Draheim, The
Groundfish Industries of New England (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Cir. 121, 1961); V.
Arnold, An Analysis to Determine Optimum Shrimp Fishing Effort by Area (U.S. Bureau of

Commercial Fisheries Working Paper No. 40, 1970); F. Bell, Estimation of the Economic
Benefits to Fishermen Vessels and Society From Limited Entry to the Inshore U.S. Northern Lobster Fishery (Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Working Paper No. 36, 1970).
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mates for the total amount of economic rents being dissipated in the
United States, much less for the world as a whole.
It is much more difficult to measure the wastes associated with the
use of other common property resources of the oceans. The minerals
of the sea bed of the high seas have not yet been commercially
exploited and are not likely to be exploited under common property
conditions unless there is total failure at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Wastes from marine pollution, where use
of one set of flow of services interferes with another, are present and
may be considerable in inshore areas. Congestion of commercial
shipping in narrow straits and around headlands produces costs in
terms of lost time and increased risk of collision.
In summary, it is clear that the common property condition that
governs the use of most ocean resources is a source of economic
waste. The amount of waste may be quite large for marine fisheries
and may be important, though presently immeasurable, for other
resources and uses of the seas. These wastes reflect the value that
might be achieved by removing the condition of common property,
either directly or indirectly.
However, the condition of common property is not removed without cost, and the question remains whether the transaction costs of
achieving satisfactory property rights by making the flow of services
divisible or by controlling access are less than the values that can be
gained.
THE PRESENT STATUS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OCEAN
The principle of the freedom of the seas emerged from the arguments presented in the early 1600's when Hugo Grotius defended the
right of the Dutch to navigate the Indian Ocean, which the Portuguese claimed to be their exclusive territorial waters.9 One of the
main arguments made by Grotius and his followers was that the costs
and difficulties of acquiring and enforcing exclusive rights in the high
seas were greater than the benefits that could be obtained. They
argued that the vastness of the seas precluded effective enforcement
of rights except over a narrow coastal margin: "imperium terraefiniri
ubi finitur armorum potestas" (the dominion of land ends where the
power of arms ends).1 0 This was assumed to be the limit of a cannon
shot. It was also argued that the seas' resources were so abundant
that there was little or no value to exclusive rights: "The extent of
9. C. Fenwick, International Law 292 (1924); Grotius, Mare Liberum (1608); Grotius,
De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625).
10. C. van Bynkershock, Questiones Juris Publici (1737) in A. Volkov, Maritime Law

(1969).
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the ocean is in fact so great that it suffices for any possible use on
the part of all peoples for drawing water, for fishing, for sailing."' '
The arguments of Grotius and his followers prevailed and "by the
mid-eighteenth century it was clear that the era of claim to exclusive
sovereignty over extensive areas of the sea had passed, and virtually
every textwriter who touched upon the subject accepted Grotius'
basic premises: the open sea cannot be occupied; it is indivisible,
inexhaustible, and productive without the increment of man's labor;
it cannot be allotted or appropriated; and there is no moral excuse
for abandoning the original community of goods." 1 2
For more than two centuries the ocean and its resources beyond
narrow limits of national jurisdiction have been treated as the common property of the world community. For most of the ocean's
resources over most of this period the consequences have not been
excessively damaging. While there was evidence that certain fish
stocks in certain localities were over-fished and depleted and conflicts over fishing rights broke out from time to time, the fishermen
could often find opportunities further afield. But in the period since
the Second World War changes of such great nature have taken place
that the viability of continued maintenance of the common property
condition for ocean resources is doubtful.
The changes have both economic and political characteristics. For
fisheries a rapid increase in demand, particularly for fish caught for
fish meal, led to a rate of increase in world catch of about six to
seven percent per year and to extension of effort worldwide by
several countries. In 1969, however, total world catch was lower than
it was in 1968. The current projections indicate that the future rate
of increase will probably be no more than three percent per year and
may actually be much lower. Most of the species for which there is an
effective demand are already being fully utilized. There are no significant opportunities for cultivation of marine fisheries and increasing
the annual yields. While there are a few stocks that can be further
developed-in the Indian Ocean and off the coast of Argentina-the
amounts that can be caught are not particularly large relative to the
total world catch. One possible exception is that of krill-a small,
shrimplike animal-in the Antarctic. But even if this leads to
dramatic increases in total world catch, it will do little to reduce the
pressures and problems associated with most of the world's fisheries.
There are several important consequences arising from the pressures of demand on supply. Biological waste has become more prev11. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) in D. Johnston, supra note 5, at 166.
12. Johnston, supra note 5, at 173.
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alent and more rapid. A particular stock of fish may now become
depleted within a few seasons of fishing. Economic waste is also
becoming more widespread. In addition, several countries, particularly the Soviet Union and others in the Eastern Bloc but including
some from western Europe and a few developing countries as well,
have developed far-ranging, technologically efficient fishing fleets
that are capable of intensive fishing off the coasts of all countries of
the world. Finally, there has been a significant increase in the value
of obtaining exclusive rights over fish stocks.
Petroleum resources underlying the continental shelf and slope are
also attracting increasing attention. There has been a fairly steady
advance of oil rigs into deeper and deeper waters, raising the question
as to where the limits of coastal nation jurisdiction should be drawn.
A unique problem of establishment and enforcement of property
rights has been created by the recent commercial interest in the
manganese nodules that cover vast areas of the sea bed. These
nodules, high in content of nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese,
are richest in the deeper waters-15,000 feet and below. Most of the
deposits currently being explored for possible exploitation lie in the
Pacific Ocean beyond 200 nautical miles from land and, consequently, beyond what is likely to be the maximum extent of national
jurisdiction.
Since commercial exploitation has not yet taken place (though it
may be attempted within the next few years), there are still wide
differences of opinion as to the likely economic conditions and consequences of the ventures. Some maintain that the deposits are so
uniform in value over such large areas that exclusive rights are not
necessary for the purposes of preventing claim-jumping. Others point
out that satisfactory title is necessary in order to acquire financing.
In addition, a major area of contention at the United Nations Conference is whether the sea-bed agency should or should not have the
right to exploit the resources itself.
Changes in political conditions are also affecting the principle of
the freedom of the seas and the characteristics of property rights in
the world ocean. Some of these lead to demands for minimizing the
extent and content of national jurisdiction. In particular, military
interests in the U.S. and USSR are anxious to maintain the maximum
freedom of transit for military craft. The importance of the ocean to
the strategy of nuclear deterrence increased rapidly with the development of relatively silent, deep-running, and wide-ranging nuclear submarines. If coastal nations acquire the right to require submarines to pass through their waters on the surface, rather than
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submerged, this would facilitate the tracking of submarines and
diminish the value of the ocean's opacity.
In this regard, the military is joined by commercial shipping
interests. They fear that extension of the rights of nations to impose
pollution controls would seriously disrupt the movement of shipping,
particularly through narrow straits currently considered international.
There is also strong political opposition to maintaining the principle of the freedom of the seas. While this principle provides all
nations with free and equal access to the ocean's wealth, it means, in
reality, that the distribution of wealth favors the wealthy. Under the
principle the benefits of ocean resources can only be acquired by
those who exercise their right of access. Those who do not have the
capital or the technology to exercise this right receive few or no
direct benefits from use of the ocean and its resources beyond their
jurisdiction.
The recent emergence of a large number of new nations, virtually
all of which fall into the "have-not" category, has produced a major
political force that finds the principle of the freedom of the seas
wanting. While not all of these nations would be benefited uniformly by any particular proposal for establishing property rights
over ocean resources, they all share in the demand for the abolishment of the freedom of the seas as interpreted by the major maritime
states, and in demand for a distribution of the seas' wealth more in
their favor. These political pressures for change can be considered
inexorable, even if the results of the change cannot be anticipated
fully.
As can be seen, the present status of property rights in the world
ocean is one of flux. For many of the ocean's resources, the conditions that permitted the maintenance of common property no longer
exist. The value of acquiring and enforcing exclusive rights has risen
considerably. At the same time, costs and difficulties have fallen.
Politically, claims to extended areas of jurisdiction have increasing
legitimacy. Economically, the use of aircraft and high powered
vessels has reduced the costs of enforcement, although it should be
noted that these costs may still be high.
ALTERNATIVE JURISDICTIONAL PATTERNS
It is generally agreed that the jurisdiction of nations should not
extend to the mid-points of the oceans but should terminate at some
uniform limit and that, beyond that limit, the international character
of the oceans should remain. There is no general agreement, however,
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as to where the limit should be drawn, nor, more importantly, is
there general agreement as to the authority of a nation within the
limit.
Most observers feel that there is a general movement toward a 200
nautical mile limit of national jurisdiction. It may be that this limit
will be extended to the edge of the continental shelf or of the continental margin in the few cases where these lie beyond 200 nautical
miles. Assuming that the limits are drawn somewhat along these
lines, there are then two sets of jurisdictional questions-those dealing with the rights governing resource use in the high seas beyond
national limits and those dealing with the rights within the coastal
margins. These will be treated separately below.
High Seas
The manganese nodules of the deep sea-bed represent the only
tangible items of wealth in the world that are clearly non-national in
character. They thus provide particularly intriguing and difficult
questions for the determination of the jurisdiction that will govern
their use. It would appear that some interests assume that the sea-bed
nodules are unowned and therefore "up for grabs" by the first exploiter, whether private entrepreneur or national government. This
appears to be the view of Deep Sea Ventures, Inc., a subsidiary of
Tenneco, which has laid claim to an area in the Pacific that is about
the size of Ireland. A more prevalent view is that the nodules should
be considered part of the "common heritage" of mankind-with
some of mankind more equal than others. According to the United
Nations Declaration of Principles adopted in 1970, "the exploration
of the (deep sea-bed) area and the exploitation of its resources
should be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether land-locked or
coastal, and taking into particular consideration the interests and
needs of the developing countries."' '
These alternative definitions find expression in proposals relating
to creation of an international sea-bed resources agency. With regard
to problems of allocating exploitation rights and distributing benefits
(just two of the numerous problems raised), there are three major
variations: an enterprise system, a licensing scheme, and unilateral
protection of national entrepreneurs.
The enterprise system would give the sea-bed agency authority not
only to license exploitation ventures but also to undertake exploitation itself. This proposal before the United Nations Conference is
13. UNGA Resolution 2749 (XXV).
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advanced by developing countries for two reasons. First, they feel
that this would provide them more direct participation in sea-bed
mining than a license system. Second, several developing countries
that produce and export the metals contained in the nodules wish to
control production from the sea-bed to minimize the impact on their
markets.
The enterprise system is strenuously opposed by the developed
countries that anticipate engaging in sea-bed mining (the United
States, Japan, and West Germany, in particular). These countries
tend to support a system that would license entrepreneurs on a
"first-come, first-served" basis and that would extract some degree of
economic rent from the exploiters to be used for the benefit of
mankind.
The third variant was raised in the ninety-third Congress of the
United States as Bill S. 1134 Amendment 946. This Bill, designated
an "interim" measure, is designed to provide sufficient protection for
U.S. investments so that the necessary capital can be raised. It would
reimburse U.S. companies for the value of their investment taken or
impaired by the adoption of an international convention on sea-bed
mining.
Although the eventual outcome cannot be anticipated, it is possible to raise some speculations about the consequences of the three
different approaches. Adoption of a sea-bed mining bill similar to
that described above could well lead to failure of the United Nations
Conference. Even though this is stated to be an "interim" measure,
its passage would probably be considered a unilateral action by most
of the Conference delegations. It might be interpreted as unwillingness on the part of the United States to negotiate its interests at the
Conference and would probably stimulate a rash of unilateral actions
by other countries on the range of issues being considered.
The controversy with regard to the enterprise versus the licensing
system has developed a strong ideological cast. The developing countries feel that they have a particularly strong interest in deep sea-bed
resources. They are aware that, without controls, the benefits will
accrue not only to the producers but also, through lower prices, to
the consumers of the metals that are produced, and that both producers and consumers will be primarily the developed countries.
They also fear that a licensing system would impede eventual
development of the technological capacity to exploit the resources
themselves. Even though an enterprise system might reduce the
economic rents that can be extracted for their benefit, they are
willing to trade these off for a "piece of the action" and a more
direct participation in sea-bed mining.
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Advocates of the licensing system, on the other hand, fear that the
enterprise system would leave them with the risks but not the
profits; that it would deprive them of an assured source of scarce
materials, leaving them vulnerable to OPEC-type actions by the raw
material producing countries; and that it would mean maintenance of
high prices for consumers.
In resolving this controversy, it would be useful to evaluate the
expected benefits of the licensing system and measure these against
the costs that might be incurred by antagonizing a large part of the
world community.
In addition to manganese nodules, there are certain other resources that occur behond the 200 mile limit, the most important of
which are whales, salmon, and tuna. For some stocks of these species
certain forms of property rights of a de facto nature already exist.
These are rights of presumed or actual exclusion obtained through
the techniques of national quotas and the "doctrine of abstention."
The technique of national quotas provides for allocation of shares
of the total allowable yield to participating countries. In the case of
the whales of the Antarctic, shares were divided on the basis of past
records of catch and were distributed to whaling fleets that were
then in use. The de facto property rights were sufficiently firm to
permit a market for the quotas, as indicated by ability of the Japanese to purchase the quotas of the Dutch and the British by buying
their fleets.
National quotas are also in effect for a number of other fisheries,
several of which fall within 200 miles of shore. 4 This system, however, can only succeed if there are no new entrants (or in the case of
the Northwest Atlantic agreement, if the new entrants do not take
up more than the amount reserved for their use). It is thus based on
the presumed exclusion of new entrants, even though, under the
principle of the freedom of the seas, there is no legal basis for enforcing exclusion.
The "doctrine of abstention" has been applied to certain salmon
stocks. Where a stock is fully utilized by one or more countries and
where investments are being made in conservation and management,
the doctrine requires that other countries should abstain from fishing
the stock. The most significant application of this so-called doctrine
is found in the 1952 agreement under which Japan abstains from
taking salmon on the high seas east of the 175°W meridian. Japan's
agreement was given in exchange for the U.S. signature on the Peace
14. See Christy, Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Arrangements: A Test of the Species
Approach, 1 Ocean Development & Int'l. L.J. (No. 1, 1973).
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Treaty, and thus it might be said that there was a market of sorts for
the resource.
As in the case of national quotas, the success of this means of
acquiring "property rights" depends upon exclusion of non-signatories-an exclusion that is increasingly difficult to maintain as a
growing number of countries extend their fishing efforts into far
distant waters.
At the United Nations conference the United States has proposed
separate treatment for salmon and tuna. It has proposed that anadromous species, such as salmon, which spawn in fresh water and live in
the ocean, be subject to the exclusive control of the host state and
that there be no harvesting of the resource on the high seas. In
essence, the proposal provides that the salmon stock should be the
"property" of the country in whose waters it is spawned. This proposal is opposed by those countries which have an interest in salmon
but do not have spawning streams.
Separate treatment is also suggested for "highly migratory species"
such as tuna because these species swim inside and outside a 200 mile
limit and may cover an entire ocean. It is maintained that satisfactory controls cannot be exercised by coastal nations if their jurisdiction ends at 200 miles and that there must be an international agency
made up of fishing states and coastal states. In response, it is argued
that the coastal nations alone should exercise the necessary controls
in a contiguous zone that covers the entire range of the stocks.
As can be seen in each of the above cases, attempts are underway
to remove the common property condition for the resources of the
high seas. There are attempts to make the resource or its flow of
services divisible and attempts to control access. Since the manganese
nodules, being fixed in place, are readily divisible, the common
property condition is likely to be removed. Even if the Conference
fails to arrive at an agreement for a sea-bed agency, the resources are
so vast that they could probably be exploited without specific exclusive rights for some time to come. The absence of satisfactory
machinery, however, may well have other detrimental effects on the
world community interest in sea-bed mining.
For the whales of the Antarctic, the presumed exclusion of new
entrants may continue simply because the resources have become so
severely depleted that they are not likely to attract newcomers.
Salmon fisheries are of interest only to a handful of countries in the
northern latitudes. The countries in whose waters the salmon spawn
are likely to be able to acquire and maintain exclusion of others by
the use of sanctions or trade-offs of one kind or another. In some of
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these countries, however, the common property condition may
remain at the domestic level.
For tuna fisheries, however, it is quite possible that the common
property condition will persist, both internationally and intra-nationally. Vessel construction is growing rapidly in many countries in
response to rising prices. The intentions of these countries are such
that agreement on a system of national quotas is unlikely. They
would be unwilling to divide up the yields on the basis of present or
past records of catch. And the aggregate of their anticipated levels of
catch is probably greater than the yields that can be sustained. But
even if the tuna fishing countries could reach agreement among
themselves, it is not likely that the agreements would satisfy the
many countries through whose claimed waters the tuna swim. It is
not impossible that failure to reach agreements on national quotas or
on controls over access will precipitate collapse of the present conservation arrangements, so that in addition to over-capitalization, the
fisheries will become depleted.
CoastalMargin
Rights over the resources of the coastal margin are generally
treated in two different categories-those governing the exploitation
of the sea-bed resources of the continental shelf and those governing
all other resources and uses in the superjacent waters. In neither case
are the rights uniformly defined, either in extent or in content.
For the resources of the sea-bed, the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf provides coastal states with fully exclusive
jurisdiction out to the depth of 200 meters or beyond "to where the
depth of the superjacent waters admits of exploitation." There is
general agreement that the 200 meter limit is too narrow and that
there should be some fixed limit at a greater depth. While several
countries have suggested the edge of the continental margin, where
the ocean abyss begins, this would be hard to determine in many
areas and in other areas would mean a vast extension of rights to
several hundred miles. An alternative approach is to fix the limit at a
certain depth, such as 2500 meters. While this might not fully incorporate the continental margin in certain regions, it is probably sufficient to govern exploitation for many years to come.
With regard to the content of the rights, the United States has
proposed that the coastal state have full control over access in the
area beyond 200 meters, but that it share any revenues with the
international community. This proposal has not received much
support except from some of the landlocked countries and is now
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being reappraised within the U.S. government. The proposal will probably be dropped, and the jurisdiction of coastal states over sea-bed
resources will probably be fully exclusive out to whatever limit is
accepted.
Above the sea-bed the resources are subject to the regime of the
territorial sea and contiguous zone. The territorial sea provides
coastal states with fully exclusive jurisdiction over all resources and
use of the sea, with the exception that foreign vessels have a right of
innocent passage. Currently, claims to the territorial sea range from
three to two hundred nautical miles. The concept of the contiguous
zone was designed to provide coastal nations with exclusive rights
over fisheries to the distance of 12 miles.
A more recent concept is that of the economic zone or the patrimonial sea. This would cover an extensive area-probably 200 nautical miles-but limit the coastal state's jurisdiction to something less
than that of a territorial sea. While there is a trend towards agreement on a 200 mile limit, there are no clear indications of a consensus regarding the content of jurisdiction.
For fisheries, some countries propose fully exclusive rights under
which they may, if they wish, permit foreign fishing. Others have
proposed that the coastal state be required to let foreigners fish for
stocks that are not fully utilized by its own fishermen. They assert
that the right of the coastal state should be limited to the amount
that it is capable of taking.
The use of the capacity criterion would make the flow of services
from the resources divisible into national quotas and would provide a
degree of control over access. It is, however, an open-ended criterion
dependent upon the coastal country's investment in fishing effort.
The natural incentive would be to increase capacity in order to increase the share of the yield. Thus, it would not provide an effective
division of the resources, and the common property would remain
-at least until the coastal nation'had acquired the capacity to take
the total allowable catch.
But even if the capacity criterion is not adopted and the coastal
state can dispose of the fisheries as it wishes, there will still be
numerous situations where control over access may be ineffective.
These occur where stocks migrate along coastlines and swim through
the zones of two or more neighboring countries. In these situations,
the common property condition can only be removed by joint
arrangements between the countries sharing the stocks. The extension of jurisdiction provides coastal states with authority to control
access by distant water fishing countries but does not remove the
necessity for regional agreements among neighboring countries.
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An additional difficulty lies in enforcement of controls. While
enforcement technology has increased considerably since the days of
Grotius, costs may still be very high for an area extending to 200
miles from shore. The amount of cost depends upon the kinds of
controls that are imposed, as well as upon the migratory patterns of
the stocks. For example, some controls simply require surveillance
by aircraft, whereas others may require inspection on board the fishing vessel. Enforcement against foreigners in one's own waters is
easier to achieve than enforcement in the waters of a neighboring
state. For enforcement to be successful the essential requirement is
good faith between parties. If good faith does not exist, it may well
be that the costs of enforcing controls are greater than the returns
that can be achieved.
Finally, the task of removing the condition of common property
for fisheries has an extremely important intra-national dimension
that has been mentioned only briefly. If a country acquires a guaranteed share of the yield from a stock of fish through the national
quota approach or acquires the right to control foreign access, it
gains the ability to remove the common property condition for its
own fishermen. Whether or not it takes advantage of that ability
depends upon a host of factors that cannot be considered fully
here.' '
The challenge is particularly urgent within the United States,
where many fisheries are economically depressed and marked by
overage vessels, inefficient regulations, and high management costs.
Provision of some form of property rights through license limits,
taxes, or fisherman quotas raises numerous questions of an economic, political, and social nature. These questions need considerable
attention in order to determine the desirability of access controls and
the best means of achieving them.
SUMMARY
There are two factors involved in the move toward establishment
and enforcement of jurisdiction over ocean resources-the economic
desirability of creating satisfactory property rights and political pressures for redistributing the seas' wealth. With regard to the first
factor, it is clear that considerable economic wastes result from
the present common property condition. It is not clear, however,
whether the costs of acquiring and enforcing some form of satisfactory property rights are less than the benefits that can be achieved.
15. See Christy, Fisheries Goals and Rights of Property, 98 Transactions of the Am. Fisheries Soc'y. (No. 2, 1969); Christy, Fisherman Quotas (Law of the Sea Institute, Occasional
Paper No. 19, 1974).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JO UR NA L

[Vol, 15

This is a particularly difficult calculation to make for many fishery
resources, especially those that swim freely across man's boundaries.
It is less difficult for the minerals of the sea-bed, but there are
ancillary problems that will require a great deal of effort to resolve.
Whether or not the calculations indicate that acquisition and
enforcement of jurisdiction is desirable, the political pressures are
such that attempts to acquire jurisdiction can be considered inexorable, at least for resources of the coastal maigin. These pressures are
now being expressed at the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, which has delegates from almost every nation in the
world. The complexities of the issues, together with the participation
of such a large number of countries, make the outcome unclear.
The Conference could fall apart if impatience drives an increasing
number of countries to take unilateral actions. It could fail if the
majority reaches decisions that are unacceptable to the powerful
maritime states, such as the United States and the USSR. It could
also fail if the decisions reached are so general that they provide
insufficient guides for future management and distribution of the
seas' wealth.
But the outcome of the Conference will not affect the drive
toward extended and enlarged authority of coastal nations over the
ocean's resources. Nor will the Conference, even if successful, fully
resolve the problems associated with exercise and enforcement of
that authority. The transition from the principle of the freedom of
the seas to establishment of effective property rights is an extremely
difficult one, and steps currently being taken should only be considered the first steps along a torturous path.

